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 I. Introduction 
The empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of aid has produced contrasting 
results. While some authors claim that the effects of aid on growth and development have 
been historically very close to zero (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008), or even negative 
(Easterly, 2007), others (like Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004; Roodman, 2007a; 
Hansen and Tarp, 2000) conclude that on average aid has had a positive effect on growth. 
Given the actual size of aid transfers, these mixed findings are to some extent disappointing, 
but conceivably also not surprising “[…] given the heterogeneity of aid motives, the 
limitations of the tools of analysis, and the complex causality chain linking external aid to 
final outcomes.” (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007, p. 316). One way in which most of the 
recent empirical studies reflect the fact that the causality chain linking aid to outcomes is 
complex, is the common conclusion that the effects of aid are highly dependent on 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the recipient countries. This is also the starting point in this 
paper, where we reformulate the fundamental question on aid's effectiveness in a way that 
helps to identify specific mechanisms at work, and the individual country characteristics that 
matter. 
Some papers already go along this line by trying to identify factors directly undermining aid's 
capacity to increase growth. The arguments advanced in these papers basically belong to one 
of two different strands. The first is concentrated on the negative incentives and effects that 
aid may have on the institutional quality of the recipient countries (see for example Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2007, and Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). The basic idea is that foreign aid may 
reduce the pressure to embark on necessary institutional reforms in the recipient countries. 
Some of the reasons are that aid appears as a windfall of resources alleviating structural 
deficits for irresponsible fiscal authorities, or that aid tends to spur corruption and 
competition for the rents it might create among special-interest groups. 1
The second strand is related to possible detrimental macroeconomic effects of aid (see for 
example Adam and Bevan, 2006; Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006; de Renzio, 2007). The 
main argument in these studies is that the capacity to "absorb" the aid influx in an effective 
1
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 manner can be severely restricted. The combination of a lack of absorption capacity and a 
relatively large size of aid receipts can translate into inflationary pressures and a tendency of 
the domestic currency to appreciate. This hurts exportable sectors directly, and may affect 
aggregate output growth and employment if the effects are sustained over a certain period. 
The prospect of effects like these may rise even further as donors have promised a substantial 
scaling-up of financial aid to the poorest countries. 
This paper belongs to this second strand. The main question is to which extent foreign aid to 
poor countries has effectively limited the growth of exportable sectors. In particular, the 
paper presents an empirical assessment of the effects of aid on growth rates of average labour 
productivity at the aggregate level, and a disaggregation of this effect between the impact on 
the tradable (exportable) sector and the nontradable sector. A comprehensive empirical 
analysis of this issue at the cross-country level is absent in the existing literature on foreign 
aid. The currently available estimates of the impact of aid on sectoral competitiveness and 
labour productivity rely on highly stylized simulations (Adam and Bevan, 2006), have been 
purely concentrated on the manufacturing sector (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005), or the 
agricultural sector (Feeny and Ouattara, 2007). 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide estimates of the effects of aid on growth of 
average labour productivity in sectors producing most of the tradable (exportable) goods and 
in those producing most of the nontradable goods. The main results show significant positive 
effects of aid on labour productivity growth in both sectors. They are robust to different 
econometric specifications, conditioning factors, and the endogenous nature of the 
relationship between donors’ aid disbursements and recipients’ economic growth. 
In general, our results contrast with those of similar previous studies. Thus, in a second step, 
we explore mechanisms that provide a plausible explanation for the main findings. More 
precisely, the paper shows that a large inflow of aid might be beneficial for growth of average 
labour productivity when the recipient country has high levels of dollarization of financial 
liabilities. The basic reason is that firms indebted mostly in foreign currency benefit from an 
overvalued domestic currency, because that reduces their financial costs and burdens. This 
type of positive balance-sheet effects might be substantial in highly dollarized economies 
and, therefore, might allow firms, and the economy, to grow faster. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the link between aid 
and external competitiveness and explains how we analyze it. Section III discusses 
methodological issues. Section IV presents the empirical results, and Section V concludes. 
II. Aid, real appreciation and external competitiveness 
To explain what undermines the effect of aid on growth, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
postulate that a plausible reason is that the benefits of aid are reduced by negative side-
effects. They present evidence indicating that one of these stems from the possibility that the 
aid inflows cause overvaluation of the real exchange rate (RER) in the recipient country, and 
a consequent loss of competitiveness in the exporting sectors, reflected by "systematic 
adverse effects on growth, wages, and employment in labour intensive and export sectors" 
(Rajan and Subramanian, 2005, p. 22). 
The overall idea resembles closely the mechanics of the Dutch disease problem after an 
influx of any type of foreign resources. The Dutch disease model2 predicts that in an 
economy producing two types of goods (traded and the nontraded), a large inflow of foreign 
resources tends to push up the nominal exchange rate and make the value of the domestic 
currency stronger. Additionally, the windfall of foreign resources tends to expand the demand 
for nontraded goods, raising the price of nontraded goods if they have a relatively limited 
supply, which in turn tends to put upward pressure on the domestic rate of inflation. If both 
effects (the nominal appreciation and the increase in domestic inflation) appear combined, the 
real price of nontraded goods increases relative to the price of traded goods, which is 
equivalent to say that the real exchange rate (RER) gets overvalued. This is detrimental for 
growth in the traded sector if wages and other production costs do not adjust downwards in 
that sector. If the slowdown in the traded sector is long-lasting, it may also retard growth in 
the whole economy, especially if the production of tradable goods exhibits substantial side 
effects for the economy such as the adoption of new technology and the opening of new 
markets. 
Among the papers that have analyzed the case of Dutch disease and RER overvaluation after 
an influx of foreign aid, some show that the Dutch disease effects of aid are small (for 
example Prati, Sahay and Tressel, 2003), while others suggest that they are potentially larger 
(for example Elbadawi et al., 2007). However, there is a certain consensus among these 
                                                     
2 Described in Elbadawi et al (2007) and Nkusu (2004), for example. 
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 studies on two specific points. The first is that a windfall of foreign aid does cause RER 
overvaluation. The reason is that the negative effects of aid on the RER are difficult to avoid 
completely, given that recipient countries tend to be limited in their ability to contain the 
RER overvaluation (e.g., with contractionary monetary policies), or to expand domestic 
supply (e.g., due to problems of absorptive capacity). Killick and Foster (2007) argue that the 
doubling of aid to Africa by 2010, for example, will be difficult to manage for the recipient 
countries in ways that "do not disadvantage producers of tradeable goods, and the private 
sector generally".  
The second point of consensus is that this aid-induced RER overvaluation tends to be present 
mainly during the short run. This happens because, after the aid inflow has been received, the 
economy has the possibility of effectively expanding the domestic supply over the medium 
and longer run. An expansion in domestic supply can happen, for example, when aid is used 
to build infrastructure such as new rural roads that tends to benefit relatively more the 
nontradables sector. This helps to contain the tendency of the domestic price level to increase, 
and the tendency of the RER to get overvalued over the long run. 
Against this background, this paper presents a comprehensive econometric assessment of the 
effects of aid on growth rates of average labour productivity at the aggregate level, and a 
sectoral disaggregation of this effect, distinguishing the effect of aid on the tradable from the 
nontradable sectors. Our basic hypothesis is that, if aid causes real appreciation and a 
reduction in external competitiveness, i.e. Dutch disease type of problems, an inflow of aid 
should have a negative effect on growth of sectors producing most of the tradable goods, and 
a positive effect on sectors producing most of the nontradable goods.  
Contrary to previous papers in the literature, our results show no evidence of Dutch disease 
type effects. Hence, we explore some mechanisms that might account for this finding. The 
exploration is based on the theoretical work from Nkusu (2004), who argues that developing 
countries may exhibit some particular characteristics that reduce the probability of having 
RER overvaluation and Dutch disease type of problems after an influx of aid, or 
characteristics that even allow them to benefit when the RER gets overvalued. One of these 
characteristics is the existence of idle capacity. When a developing country with idle 
capacities receives foreign aid resources, the associated expansion in aggregate demand can 
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 be met relatively fast by an expansion of aggregate supply. This reduces the upward pressures 
on the level of inflation and, thus, also reduces the pressure for RER overvaluation.  
A second characteristic reducing risks related to Dutch disease is that production in 
developing countries is typically highly dependent on imported inputs. This implies that, with 
input costs largely denominated in foreign currency, a RER overvaluation unambiguously 
lowers total costs of production. We explore this idea by testing the hypothesis that high 
levels of dollarization of financial liabilities may offset the negative effects of real 
appreciation induced by aid, supporting positive, rather than negative, effects of aid on 
growth.  
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. First we seek to identify the marginal effect of 
aid on growth in aggregate average labour productivity, defined as the average growth rate of 
output (GDP or Total Value Added) per worker, and denoted by . This is made along the 
lines of the empirical aid-growth literature. That is, we specify a regression of growth in 
output per worker on the size of aid effectively disbursed, , the direct effects of macro 
policies' quality, p , geographical country-specific determinants, d , conditional effects of  a , 
and on (captured by a vector 
p
itg
a
p d pitg Γ  containing interaction terms between a , and with 
the level of aid disbursed),
p d
3 and other determinants of aggregate average labour productivity 
growth, : Z
.),,,,( Zafg pit Γ= dp  (1)
The second step in the empirical analysis involves a sectoral decomposition of the aggregate 
effect. We estimate the same type of model, but using measures of growth of productivity in 
the tradable (exportable) and the nontradable sectors, : p kitg ,
,),,,,(, k
p
kit Zafg Γ= dp  (2)
where {tradables, nontradables} and   is a vector of other exogenous determinants of 
sectoral average labour productivity growth. 
∈k kZ
                                                     
3 The interaction terms reflect the second‐order effects considered in the aid‐growth literature. In terms of the 
model in Dalgaard et al (2004), these effects correspond to Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) claim that aid works 
with reasonable policies ( ); Hansen and Tarp’s (2000) suggestion that aid exhibits diminishing 
returns ( ); and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp’s (2004) finding of higher aid effectiveness with 
better geographic/climatic conditions ( ). 
0/2 >∂∂∂ pag
0/ 22 <∂∂ ag
0/2 >∂∂∂ dag
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 These first two steps are aimed to give an answer to the question of whether foreign aid 
causes a relative loss of external competitiveness (Dutch disease) or not. The following steps 
are aimed to explore possible reasons. In particular, we analyse if financial conditions and the 
composition of debt are a relevant part of the explanation. The next steps require then (a) 
extending the aggregate models in (1) and (2) to control for the characteristics of debt in the 
aid-recipient countries, and (b) decomposing again this effect into its sectoral components. 
Accordingly, we estimate 
),,,,,( fi
p
it ZZafg Γ= dp  (3)
and 
,),,,,,(,
f
ik
p
kit ZZafg Γ= dp  (4)
where  is a vector including financial characteristics in country , in particular 
characteristics of debt in the country, and variables controlling for the RER evolution. 
f
iZ i
 
III. Method and data 
1. Econometric specification 
The basic econometric specification for the model in (1)  is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ,pitZitadapaaiitititdpaiititpit Zaaag εβτββββββ τ +++×+= ′′′ ′ βdp  dp   (5)
where    is a measure of growth in output per worker (or growth in average labour 
productivity) in country  i   during period  t  ;   , is the size of effective aid in terms of 
GDP;
p
itg
ita
4    is the Burnside and Dollar (2000) index of good macro policies;    is a 
measure of structural characteristics (Dalgaard et al., 2004), proxied by the share of tropical 
area in the country from Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999);  
itp id
τ   is a vector of time-
dummies (to control for common shocks);    is a zero-mean error component; and    is a 
vector containing other exogenous determinants of output per worker growth, specifically: (a) 
the degree of financial depth, measured as the (lagged) ratio of M2 to GDP, (b) the Knack 
and Keefer (1995) index of institutional quality, constructed from five ICRG variables and 
trying to reflect security of private property and enforceability of contracts, (c) the level of 
p
itε itZ
                                                     
4Effective aid is defined as the grant equivalent of official disbursements constructed by Chang, Fernandez‐
Arias and Serven (1998), calculated as the sum of official grants and the grant element in concessional loans. 
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 output per worker at the beginning of every period  t  , (d) the degree of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization in the country (Easterly and Levine, 1997), (e) the number of conflicts in 
which the government is involved (UCDP/PRIO, 2006), and (f) an interaction term between 
these last two. 
In a similar way, the econometric specification for the sectoral decomposition proposed in 
equation (2), is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ,,, kk pitZkitadapλaaiitititdpaiititp kit Zaaag ελτλλλλλ τ +++×+= ′′′ ′ λdp  dp   (6)
where  is a measure of output per worker in sector , p kitg , k ∈k {tradables, nontradables}, and 
the new estimated coefficients are theλ 's. 
To estimate the models in (3) and (4), which are extensions of the previous two regressions 
meant to identify as directly as possible the presence of RER overvaluation and Dutch 
disease, it is necessary to extend the vector    with variables reflecting the evolution of the 
RER and the characteristics of debt in the recipient country (in particular those related to the 
level of dollarization of financial liabilities). The variables considered for this extension are 
(a) the rate of RER devaluation (and the square of it), which helps to control for the effects 
that the RER has directly on growth,
itZ
5 (b) the amount of external debt measured as a 
proportion of GDP, and (c) the currency composition of the external debt. 
The central econometric concern for the estimation of all these regressions is the endogenous 
character of aid: aid disbursements are obviously determined to some extent by the recipient 
country's growth process itself (Berthélemy, 2006, and Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006). All 
the recent empirical literature on foreign aid effectiveness has turned to the use of 
instrumental variables (IV) to address the problem of endogeneity. We follow this line and 
perform two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations, using the set of instruments in Dalgaard 
and Hansen (2001) and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004).6 Given that our 2SLS estimates 
ran into statistical problems (as we will discuss in detail below), we also applied the GMM-
                                                     
5The square of the RER devaluation is included to model formally the idea that there exists an "equilibrium 
RER", or a RER level that keeps the balance between keeping exports competitive and keeping the level of 
inflation controlled. See for example Elbadawi et al. (2007, footnote 1, p. 1). 
6 These are Aid/GDP, lagged; (Aid/GDP) squared, lagged; (Policy x Aid/GDP), lagged; Policy x (log Initial GDP per 
capita); Policy x (log Initial GDP per capita) squared; Policy x (log Population); and a dummy for countries in the 
Central  Francophone  Africa  zone.  This  instrumentation  strategy  is  described  and  motivated  in  detail  in 
Dalgaard et al (2004), but in general it is aimed to reflect donors’ overall preference to send aid to the smallest 
and poorest countries, those with better macro policies and to account for some strategic interests of donors 
in specific groups of countries (former colonies, important trade partners, or political allies, for example). 
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 DIF estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the GMM-SYS estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
2. Data on sectoral labour productivity 
Our estimations require measures of average labour productivity in the tradable (exportable) 
and the nontradable sectors. We build these measures with data from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators on labour force participation, sectoral employment and sectoral real 
Value Added (defined as the net output of a sector --measured in constant USD-- after adding 
up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs). 
The proxies we constructed for labour productivity in the tradable (exportable) sector are (a) 
the non-services GDP per worker and (b) the sum of Agricultural and Industrial Value Added 
per worker. The proxy constructed for the nontradables sector is based on Value Added per 
worker in the Services sector. 
This distinction between tradables and nontradables sectors is made under the assumptions 
that the overall production in the economy comes from activity in agriculture, industry and 
the services sectors, and that production of nontradables is concentrated in the services sector, 
while production of tradables takes place primarily in the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
This assumption is supported by the survey in Tica and Družić (2006, Table 1), who review a 
large number of empirical papers analyzing the effects of productivity gaps on terms of trade, 
and report that none of those studies treats the services sector as producing tradables (the 58 
papers reviewed by them treat production of tradables as taking place in the agricultural 
sector, or the industrial sector, or both). The argument gathers a lot of strength when it is 
placed in the context of developing countries, where trade in agricultural and manufacturing 
goods (containing for example exports of raw agricultural commodities, agroindustrial 
products, minerals, etc.) tends to be much higher than trade in services. 
The WDI provides a measure of real Value Added per worker in the Agricultural sector, but 
not in the other sectors. We therefore constructed proxies for Value Added per worker in the 
Industrial and Services sectors. An important point is that an accurate labour productivity 
measure requires an estimate of the number of workers actually employed in the different 
sectors, rather than estimates of the number of workers in the labour force or the potential 
number of workers in each sector. Accordingly, we construct series for the effective sectoral 
allocation of labour based on sectoral employment data from the WDI. The series for sectoral 
employment were built based on interpolations of the employment data in the Agricultural, 
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 Industrial and Services sectors, and completed to fill gaps towards the end of the sample 
period under the assumption that the sectoral distribution of employment kept stable over 
time.7 For all the estimations in the remainder of the paper then, the proxies used for levels of 
sectoral labour productivity levels are measures of real Value Added in the Agricultural, the 
Industrial and the Services sectors, divided by the estimated number of employed workers in 
each corresponding sector. 
The sample covers a group of 69 developing economies over 40 years, the period between 
1962 and 2001. All the variables were averaged over periods of 4 years, to capture the 
evolution of trends rather than the incidence of cycles, and to make the results comparable to 
those in previous empirical studies. Our sample does not go beyond 2001 because many of 
the variables used in the regressions could not be updated further than that for many countries 
in the sample. 
Summary statistics of our variables are displayed in Annex Table A1, and the description of 
the countries and periods considered is given in Annex Table A2. 
 
IV. Results 
1. Impact of aid in the aggregate 
The estimated effects of aid on growth of aggregate average labour productivity, that is the 
results of regression (5), are displayed in Table 1. Column 1 contains the 2SLS estimates. 
The coefficients of interest (the coefficients on the aid variable and the 3 aid-interaction 
terms) show that aid has a positive and direct impact on growth of aggregate labour 
productivity, and that these benefits can be increased in countries with good policies, whereas 
they are lowered in countries where the amount of tropical area is large (Dalgaard et al., 
2004). This last finding can be interpreted as indicating that aid effectiveness is limited in 
countries where location and climate are disadvantageous or, in particular, in countries with 
large a amount of tropics, where the burden of diseases is larger (as suggested by Gallup et 
al., 1999, for example) or where growth in agricultural productivity is restricted (see Masters 
and Wiebe, 2000, for example). 
                                                     
7As a control, we constructed a series for the sectoral composition of the labour force assuming that for any 
given country, a larger fraction of the labour force was concentrated in sectors where the production of Value 
Added was higher. This change of measure yields qualitatively equivalent results to those reported in the 
following tables. 
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 Table 1: Aid and average labour productivity 
Dependent variable:
2SLS 2SLS/FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid/GDP 3.05*** 4.75** 0.30 2.62*** 2.67***
[1.0] [2.2] [0.8] [0.9] [0.9]
(Aid/GDP), squared -0.0055 0.038 -0.058** -0.038** -0.036**
[0.04] [0.06] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01]
(Aid/GDP)*Policy 0.17** -0.1 -0.11** -0.038 -0.038
[0.08] [0.09] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
(Aid/GDP)*Tropical area -3.20*** -5.29** 0.035 -2.32** -2.38***
[0.9] [2.3] [0.8] [0.9] [0.9]
Policy index 0.69*** 1.19*** 1.28*** 1.06*** 1.07***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Tropical area -0.55 -0.94** -0.90**
[0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
(log) Initial GDP per worker -0.49* -1.90** -6.06*** -0.82*** -0.76***
[0.3] [0.7] [1.3] [0.3] [0.2]
ICRG institutions index 0.36*** 0.25 0.25 0.40*** 0.41***
[0.09] [0.2] [0.2] [0.09] [0.10]
M2, lagged -2.36** -1.79 -3.54 -3.51*** -3.41***
[1.1] [1.6] [2.2] [1.2] [1.2]
Ethnic fractionalization -0.42 -0.36
[0.9] [1.0]
Assassinations -1.01* -1.91** -0.73 -1.21**
[0.6] [1.0] [0.9] [0.6]
Ethnic fract.*Assassin. 1.38* 2.58** 0.34 1.36*
[0.8] [1.2] [1.5] [0.8]
Observations 460 459 457 505 505
R2 0.34 0.19 . . .
Number of countries 69 68 69 69 69
Sargan test, overid. (0.79) (0.92) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0)
Cragg-Donal test, underid. (0) (0.0018)
Anderson-Rubin test, joint signif. (0.062) (0.23)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, endogeneity (0.022) (0.024)
Hausman test for FE
Number of instruments 26 20 137 179 151
AR(1) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0025)
AR(2) (0.55) (0.72) (0.71)
ME of aid > 0 (mean) 1.05*** 1.18* 0.11 0.96*** 0.97***
[0.43] [0.8] [0.29] [0.36] [0.31]
ME of aid > 0 ("good country") 3.34*** 4.36** 0.051 2.45*** 2.5***
[0.96] [2.05] [0.72] [0.92] [0.84]
ME of aid > 0 ("bad country") 0.08 -0.59 0.035 0.15 0.15
[0.32] [0.63] [0.21] [0.16] [0.15]
Growth in GDP per worker
Notes. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses. *** , **  and * denote statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10% levels. Aid/GDP instrumented as in Dalgaard et al (2004).
(0.36)
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 The rest of the coefficients in Column 1 have the expected signs: "good" policies are "good" 
for growth by themselves, initial conditions matter (the coefficient on the initial level of 
output per worker is significant), sound institutions (measured by the ICRG index) have a 
positive effect on growth, and a high number of conflicts does not contribute to higher rates 
of growth, just as do not either more ethnical division in the country. The only puzzling effect 
in column 1 is the negative and significant effect of financial depth (measured by the lagged 
ratio of money and deposits, M2, to GDP). This can be due to an omitted variable bias, since 
a high M2/GDP ratio might be correlated with high levels of other sources of foreign capital -
-for example foreign bonds, or external debt--, which act as substitutes of aid to some extent.  
The last part of column 1 in Table 3 shows a test for the hypothesis that the marginal effect 
(ME) of aid, defined as 
a
g pit
∂
∂ , is positive. Given that the ME of aid is 
iaditapitaaa
it
p
it aid
aid
g dp ββββ +++=∂
∂ 2 , (7)
it is necessary to choose a fixed point to estimate the marginal effect. The most obvious point 
is the mean of the different variables composing it (that is, the mean levels of aid, the macro 
policy index, and the percentage of tropical area in the country). However, Figures 1 and 2 
show that the distributions for aid and the share of tropical area are highly asymmetric.  
Figure 1: Aid/GDP – Density plot 
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 Figure 2: Tropical area index – Density plot 
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Figure 1 shows that the distribution of aid is skewed to the left and has a relatively fatter 
right-hand side tail. This reflects the fact that countries receive in general some (relatively 
low level of) aid; but, with a certain frequency, countries receive a much larger amount of 
aid, e.g. in the form humanitarian aid after a natural disaster, or for the reconstruction of an 
area after a period of conflict. Figure 2 shows the distribution for the amount of tropical area 
in the countries in the sample, which is bimodal, and reflects the fact that most of the aid-
recipients are located either in highly tropical areas, or in places that are considerably far 
from the tropical lands. This is relevant because, with this type of distributions, the average 
country may not reflect the most typical characteristics, and evaluating the marginal effect at 
the mean can be misleading. Table 1 therefore also presents the marginal effects of aid 
evaluated at two other points. The first is defined as a hypothetical "good country", receiving 
a low amount of aid (equivalent to the level at the 25th percentile in the aid distribution), 
being located outside the tropics (at the 25th percentile in the distribution of tropical area), 
and exhibiting a high level for the quality-of-policy index (at the 75th percentile of the 
Burnside-Dollar policy index distribution). The second hypothetical point of evaluation is a 
"bad country", or a country that receives a large amount of aid (75th percentile), has a low 
level for the index of good macro policies (25th percentile) and is located in a very tropical 
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 area (75th percentile). These two definitions are arbitrary, but they can be understood as an 
approximation of the upper and lower bounds for the "typical" marginal effect of aid. 
It turns out that aid has a net positive and highly significant effect in the average country. The 
effect is equally significant, but 3 times larger for a "good country", and statistically not 
different from zero for a "bad country". 
As for the validity of the 2SLS regressions, the tests on the quality of instrumentation show 
overall good results: (1) a high p-value for the Sargan test of overidentification does not 
allow to reject the hypothesis that the set of instruments employed are valid, (2) a low p-value 
for the Cragg-Donald test of underidentification implies that the instruments are not weak, (3) 
the low p-value for the Anderson-Rubin test for joint significance of the endogenous 
regressors cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments are jointly significant, and (4) the 
low p-value for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity of the instruments allows to 
reject the hypothesis that the endogenous regressors can be treated as exogenous, indicating 
that the use of IV in this specification is appropriate. 
However, even though the specification is comprehensive with respect to the main 
determinants of growth, it is possible that there are important unobserved individual country 
characteristics that are being omitted in the regression. To control for this, Column 2 in Table 
1 presents the same regression as in Column 1, but estimates the model including individual 
country fixed effects. The results are relatively similar to the ones in Column 1 regarding the 
significance of the coefficients of interest, the tests on the quality of instrumentation, and the 
significance of the marginal effect of aid evaluated at different points. From the statistic for 
the (Hausman) test of fixed-effects, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the country 
fixed effects are significant and, thus, correctly included in Column 2. 
This poses a serious problem for these first two regressions. The reason is that if both the 
unobserved country characteristics and the lagged level of the dependent variable are 
significant and belong into the regression, then the 2SLS regression in Column 1 is 
misspecified (because it lacks the fixed-effects terms), and the 2SLS/FE regression in 
Column 2 gives inconsistent estimates (because differencing the data and estimating the 
regression with the lagged level of the dependent variable on the right-hand side introduces 
correlation between one of the regressors and the error term, by construction). 
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 An appropriate estimator for a panel data model where (a) unobserved individual fixed 
effects are relevant and (b) a lagged level of the dependent variable needs to be included as a 
regressor, is the GMM-DIF estimator. This method estimates the regression in first 
differences, and instruments the lagged differences in the right-hand side with lagged levels 
of the variables. The number of lags to be included can be chosen arbitrarily, but following 
Roodman (2007b), we restrict them to be only the ones starting from the second. 
Column 3 in Table 1 presents the regression with the GMM-DIF estimator. The results are 
quite different from the ones before. In particular, aid now has no significant effect on 
growth. Column 3 reports however a high coefficient for the lagged level of the dependent 
variable, which reflects a high level of autocorrelation. As shown by Arellano and Bover 
(1995), lagged levels are weak instruments of current differences when the series are highly 
persistent. The autocorrelation tests displayed in column 3 show high AR(1) for the error 
term in the model in differences (which is expected to happen), but high AR(2) as well, 
supporting the conjecture that the dependent variable is highly persistent. In this case, first-
differences cannot be strongly instrumented by lagged levels. 
The alternative is to use the GMM-SYS estimator, which complements the model in 
differences with equations in levels and instruments based on lagged differences. The GMM-
SYS estimates suggest that aid has a positive effect on growth, that the effect is not 
dependent on the quality of macro policies but on the type of structural country 
characteristics, and that the overall effect operates with diminishing returns. The estimates of 
the marginal effects of aid are similar to those in column 1. A higher p-value for the absence 
of AR(2) shows an improvement in the quality of estimation and instrumentation compared 
to the GMM-DIF estimation in column 3. 
Finally, Column 5 in Table 1 drops the variables associated with country conflict and 
division; this helps to reduce problems of multicollinearity and the total number of 
instruments, does not change the significance of the rest of the variables in the model, and 
allows a more precise estimation of the marginal effects. We therefore regard it as the 
preferred econometric specification. 
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 2. Sectoral disaggregation of the impact of aid 
Table 2 presents the sectoral decomposition of the aggregate effect of aid on growth. To 
provide a benchmark, column 1 shows again the aggregate effects of aid on growth 
(corresponding to Column 5 in Table 1, the preferred specification for the aggregate model). 
Columns 2 and 3 contain estimates for the sectors likely to be producing most of the 
exportable goods (the tradables sector). The proxy for output in the tradables sector 
considered in Column 2 is output in the non-Services sector, and the one considered in 
Column 3 is the aggregation of Value Added in the Agricultural and the Industrial sectors. 
The most important difference between these two regressions is that column 3 shows a 
significant coefficient for the aid-squared term, while column 2 does not. But the rest of the 
coefficients of interest are similar in size and significance in the two specifications. Despite 
the difference in the coefficient on the aid-squared term, the overall conclusion from the 
marginal effects remains the same: aid is shown to have a positive marginal effect in the 
tradables sector in the average country, a three times higher effect in countries with more 
favourable conditions, and no significant effect in countries with less favourable conditions. 
Column 4 shows the estimates of the effects of aid in the Services sector, which is taken as a 
proxy for the sector producing most of the nontradable goods in a developing economy. This 
column reveals a more independent impact from aid compared to Columns 2 and 3 in the 
sense that the interaction term with tropical area is no longer significant. Evaluated at the 
mean, the size of the marginal effects turns out to be roughly equal in services and non-
services sectors. For “good” countries, the size of the marginal effect is even lower than in 
columns 2 and 3, while for “bad” countries it becomes significantly positive. 
Overall, these findings do not point to systematic differences in the impact of aid on tradable 
and nontradable production. This is the main result of the paper. It can be interpreted as 
providing empirical evidence against the hypothesis that aid is detrimental for external 
competitiveness and growth in average labour productivity, or that aid causes Dutch disease. 
If aid was a cause of Dutch disease, two "symptoms" after an inflow of aid would have to be 
a decline in the growth of the exportable (or tradables) sector, and a relative increase in the 
growth rate of the nontradables sector. The estimates of the marginal effects of aid in 
Columns 1-4 of Table 2 suggest the opposite: evaluated at the mean and at the "good" 
country levels (where estimates are statistically significant), aid does not seem to cause a 
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 slowdown in the exportables sector compared to the aggregate level, nor an acceleration of 
the nontradables sector compared to the aggregate level. 
Decomposing further the effect in column 3 (that is, decomposing the proxy for the tradables 
sector), Columns 5 and 6 indicate that the positive effects of aid on growth of the exportables 
sector actually come from the Industrial sector rather than the Agricultural sector. This 
implies that the external competitiveness of manufactures, minerals and agroindustrial 
products (all activities within the Industrial sector) is unlikely to deteriorate in response to an 
inflow of foreign aid. 
3. Real appreciation and the absence of Dutch Disease 
A more rigorous test of the link between aid, growth and Dutch disease needs to account for 
variables that might play a central role in this relationship. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 
account for the effects of changes in the RER. The rate of RER devaluation is treated as 
endogenous within the model. After controlling for it, the marginal effects of aid estimated 
drop to half the size of the ones in the preferred specification (reproduced in Column 1). The 
square of RER devaluation is included in Column 3 to capture the idea that countries tend to 
benefit from a devaluated RER (because that tends to increase exports' competitiveness), but 
that after a certain point a too fast rate of RER devaluation can be passed to higher inflation 
rates, which starts to limit the (initial) benefits of RER devaluation. 
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 account for the degree of external indebtedness and the currency 
composition of debt. Column 4 introduces the ratio of external debt to GDP, and Column 5 
the percentage of dollarization in the country's overall level of debt, as a measure of the 
currency composition of the debt and the country's financial exposure to changes in the 
exchange rate. 
From columns 2 to 5 it can be seen that the variables measuring RER devaluation, the ratio of 
external debt to GDP and the measure of debt's currency composition are marginally 
significant or not significant individually. However, when all these new variables are 
included at the same time, three of them become highly significant, and the fourth marginally 
significant (Column 6). 
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 Table 3: Aid, labour productivity and financial factors 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP 2.67*** 1.30** 1.43*** 2.67*** 2.22** 1.39***
[0.9] [0.5] [0.5] [0.9] [0.9] [0.5]
(Aid/GDP), squared -0.036** -0.016 -0.015 -0.020** -0.022** -0.023**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
(Aid/GDP)*Policy -0.038 -0.051 -0.066 -0.13* -0.018 -0.16**
[0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.08] [0.06] [0.07]
(Aid/GDP)*Tropical area -2.38*** -1.31** -1.45*** -2.33*** -2.10** -1.11**
[0.9] [0.5] [0.5] [0.9] [0.9] [0.5]
Policy index 1.07*** 1.05*** 1.10*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.11***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Tropical area -0.90** -0.76* -0.75* -0.87 -1.11** -0.95**
[0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
(log) Initial GDP per worker -0.76*** -0.89*** -0.85*** -0.98*** -0.98*** -1.11***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
ICRG institutions index 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.52***
[0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
M2, lagged -3.41*** -1.83 -1.86 -3.64** -3.74** -1.9
[1.2] [1.2] [1.2] [1.5] [1.6] [1.4]
Nominal devaluation 0.079 0.36** 0.40***
[0.1] [0.2] [0.1]
Nominal devaluation, squared -0.0081*** -0.0085***
[0.002] [0.002]
Ext. Debt/GDP -0.0070* -0.0083**
[0.004] [0.004]
Debt currency comp (%USD) 0.4 1.76*
[1.3] [0.9]
Observations 505 427 427 402 409 339
Number of countries 69 65 65 60 61 57
Number of instruments 176 220 264 200 200 303
AR(1) (0.0025) (0.0097) (0.013) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.034)
AR(2) (0.71) (0.61) (0.76) (0.49) (0.49) (0.52)
ME of aid > 0 (mean) 0.97*** 0.35** 0.38** 0.74*** 0.61*** 0.35**
[0.31] [0.21] [0.2] [0.28] [0.27] [0.17]
ME of aid > 0 ("good country") 2.50*** 1.14*** 1.24*** 1.20*** 1.20*** 0.53**
[0.84] [0.51] [0.47] [0.45] [0.49] [0.3]
ME of aid > 0 ("bad country") 0.15 -0.12 -0.15 0.10 0.023 -0.0037
[0.15] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11]
Growth in GDP per worker
Notes. GMM-SYS regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses. *** , **  and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Aid/GDP instrumented as in Dalgaard et al (2004).  
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 All the additional variables in regression 6 in Table 5 are treated as endogenous. This 
specification therefore provides a good basis to decompose the effect of aid on growth and 
implement a more thorough test of the relationship between aid, growth and Dutch disease. It 
is reproduced as a baseline regression in column 1 in Table 4, where the results of the sectoral 
decomposition are displayed. 
Table 4: Aid, labour productivity and financial factors – Sectoral decomposition 
Dependent variable: GDP per Non-Services Agric.&Indus. Services VA Agricultural Industrial
worker GDP per w. VA per w. per worker VA per w. VA per w.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid/GDP 1.52*** 1.62** 1.98*** 1.58* 5.25 3.04***
[0.5] [0.7] [0.7] [0.9] [6.1] [1.0]
(Aid/GDP), squared -0.023** -0.012 -0.037* -0.054 -0.35 0.0096
[0.009] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.4] [0.05]
(Aid/GDP)*Policy -0.15** -0.11 -0.15* -0.34** 0.034 -0.26*
[0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.1] [0.4] [0.2]
(Aid/GDP)*Tropical area -1.28** -1.64** -1.79*** -0.46 -1.74 -2.67***
[0.5] [0.7] [0.7] [0.8] [3.9] [1.0]
Policy index 0.95*** 0.84*** 0.90*** 1.43*** 1.47 1.40***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.4] [1.4] [0.4]
Tropical area -0.87* -0.31 -0.14 -2.42** 1.42 -0.2
[0.5] [0.7] [0.6] [0.9] [3.2] [1.0]
(log) Initial level dep. var. -1.11*** -0.98*** -0.89*** -1.57*** -2.53 -1.52***
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [2.3] [0.3]
ICRG institutions index 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.60*** -1.38 0.49***
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [1.4] [0.2]
Fin. depth (M2/GDP), lagged -2.17 -0.88 -1.39 -5.75** -11.7 -4.14
[1.4] [1.6] [1.8] [2.7] [15] [2.8]
Real exch. rate  devaluation 0.42*** 0.22 0.32 0.46** -0.27 0.32
[0.1] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.8] [0.3]
Real exch. rate dev., squared -0.0091*** -0.0071** -0.0086*** -0.0093** 0.0027 -0.0079
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.01] [0.005]
Ext. Debt/GDP -0.0077** -0.0073* -0.0068 -0.018** 0.0026 -0.017**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.02] [0.007]
Debt currency comp. (%USD) 1.62* 2.43* 2.33* 3.28 -7.01 1.16
[1.0] [1.3] [1.3] [2.9] [7.2] [1.7]
Observations 339 339 339 339 339 339
Number of countries 57 57 57 57 57 57
Number of instruments 303 302 302 302 302 302
AR(1) (0.035) (0.086) (0.072) (0.04) (0.29) (0.0011)
AR(2) (0.54) (0.37) (0.3) (0.54) (0.31) (0.18)
ME of aid > 0 (mean) 0.37*** 0.27 0.42** 0.76** 3.25 0.81***
[0.17] [0.24] [0.26] [0.47] [3.69] [0.31]
ME of aid > 0 ("good country") 0.6** 0.62* 0.81** 0.63 4.46 1.23***
[0.29] [0.39] [0.4] [0.52] [5.03] [0.55]
ME of aid > 0 ("bad country") -0.024 -0.21 -0.12 0.51 2.59 0.032
[0.11] [0.18] [0.2] [0.44] [3.16] [0.27]
Notes. GMM-SYS regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses. *** , **  and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Aid/GDP instrumented as in Dalgaard et al (2004).  
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 Table 4, similar to Table 2, provides no support for the case that aid causes Dutch disease: in 
Columns 3 and 6, for example, growth in sectors producing most of the exportables is shown 
to be positively affected by aid, and with a marginal effect larger than in the overall economy. 
Again it is the Industrial sector where the impact appears to be strongest These findings 
strengthen our evidence on the absence of Dutch disease type of problems caused by aid, 
because they turn out to be robust to the inclusion of the effects of changes in the RER and 
other relevant financial variables. 
A second interesting finding from Table 4 is the statistical significance of variables that 
reflect the exposure of the aid-recipient economies to changes in the RER, because it can be 
seen as suggestive evidence in support of positive balance-sheet effects in aid-recipient 
economies. The currency composition of foreign debt is significant only in sectors that are 
producing most of the exportable goods, suggesting that the positive balance-sheet effects are 
more likely to benefit firms producing these (exportable) goods. When this is combined with 
results from other studies showing that aid causes real appreciation, the results in Table 4 
suggest that one reason for aid not creating Dutch disease type of problems might be that 
firms in those economies benefit from (possibly aid-induced) appreciations of the RER, and 
this might probably be partially due to having an important share of their debt denominated in 
foreign currency. 
This evidence also opens space for discussion and revision of the finding that RER 
overvaluation has contractionary effects (as suggested for example by Shi, 2006), and tends 
to support the importance of balance-sheet effects mentioned in the literature on the 
contractionary effects of devaluations (see Frankel, 2005, for a recent survey on the topic). 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper presents an empirical assessment of the hypothesis that aid is detrimental for 
external competitiveness and growth in average labour productivity in the recipient countries. 
This evidence is based on a sectoral decomposition of the effects of aid on aggregate growth, 
and on an extension of the typical aid-growth econometric specification to control for the 
effects of (a) changes in the RER and (b) financial characteristics of the debt in the different 
sectors. The findings are robust to different specifications, conditioning factors, and the 
endogenous nature of aid disbursements. 
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 Our main results point to the absence of Dutch Disease effects: aid is found to have a positive 
marginal effect on growth of output per worker, at the aggregate level, and in both the 
tradable and the nontradable sectors. One possible explanation is the existence of idle 
capacity in the recipient countries, which can help to promptly meet the increase in aggregate 
demand caused by aid inflows. Another explanation, explored in the paper, is that Dutch 
disease type of problems need not materialize in an aid-recipient economy because firms in 
the tradable sector might benefit from an aid-induced RER appreciation. This would be the 
case if their debt is denominated mostly in foreign currency. We find evidence supporting the 
idea that the sectors producing most of the exportable goods indeed tend to benefit from a 
real appreciation by having an important part of the debt denominated in foreign currency.  
Taken together, the finding that aid may cause RER appreciation but not Dutch disease type 
of problems, and the finding that the marginal effects of aid in countries with "bad" policies 
and "weak" structural characteristics are close to zero but not negative, suggest that the 
effectiveness of aid depends much more on the ability of donors to reduce the negative 
incentives associated with the use of foreign aid in the recipient countries than on the ability 
to control the macroeconomic type of problems supposedly undermining the effects of 
foreign aid on growth. 
In practice, our findings suggest that the success of the planned scaling-up of aid to the 
poorest countries does not depend so much on whether the resources are spent or absorbed by 
local governments (in the sense of Killick and Foster, 2007), nor on the limitations that 
donors and agencies put on them to guarantee the right use of the aid resources, but rather on 
whether it is possible to find a way to maintain incentives in the recipient countries and to 
overcome structural bottlenecks such as low agricultural productivity in tropical areas. 
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Table A1: Summary statistics 
Obs. Mean p25 p50 p75 Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GDP per capita growth rate 505 1.41 -0.50 1.68 3.22 3.18 -12.68 10.60
k level 505 3,546.1 1,108.9 2,102.2 4,098.1 3,900.6 225.8 20,535.6
GDP per worker growth rate 505 1.09 -0.82 1.38 2.83 3.13 -12.49 9.73
level 505 8,229.8 984.4 3,410.0 7,870.3 12,759.9 195.8 73,613.2
Non-Services GDP per worker growth rate 505 1.35 -1.03 1.43 3.46 4.30 -16.35 34.28
k level 505 9,394.9 889.7 3,599.9 8,597.4 15,661.9 137.0 117,040.3
Agri.&Indust. VA per worker growth rate 504 1.23 -1.05 1.40 3.33 4.35 -18.29 34.15
level 504 7,794.3 791.4 3,350.2 7,565.6 12,033.9 123.9 81,051.6
Services VA per worker growth rate 505 1.17 -1.10 1.08 3.33 4.82 -24.20 53.38
level 505 8,450.6 1,869.6 3,810.5 7,922.1 11,865.0 152.9 67,612.8
Agricultural VA per worker growth rate 504 3.22 -1.53 0.84 2.99 38.51 -47.16 724.87
level 504 11,708.3 496.8 1,789.1 10,615.9 33,081.3 106.6 283,446.9
Industrial VA per worker growth rate 504 1.73 -1.44 1.72 4.63 5.48 -23.43 25.73
level 504 9,786.9 2,190.9 4,400.0 10,945.2 13,228.8 297.6 90,083.8
Aid/GDP 505 0.93 0.01 0.23 1.23 1.54 -4.78 10.78
Policiy index 505 1.62 1.43 1.70 2.26 0.99 -6.58 2.80
Tropical area 505 0.67 0.04 1 1 0.44 0 1
Franco-zone dummy 505 0.093 0 0 0 0.29 0 1
Ethnic fractionalization 505 0.448 0.14 0.5 0.72 0.30 0 0.93
Assasinations 505 0.349 0 0 0.25 0.75 0 7
ICRG institutional quality index 505 4.949 3.37 4.99 6.11 2.36 0.56 10
Financial depth (M2), lagged 505 0.311 0.18 0.25 0.40 0.19 0.04 1.30
Sub-Saharan Africa 505 0.269 0 0 1 0.44 0 1
East Asia 505 0.125 0 0 0 0.33 0 1
Nominal devaluation rate 427 0.333 0 0.03 0.12 1.54 -0.20 18.45
Esternal debt/GDP 402 61.99 28.94 48.89 76.10 59.43 0 768.15
Long term debt, currency composition (%USD) 409 0.480 0.34 0.48 0.63 0.20 0 0.98
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 Table A.2: Sample 
1966-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978-81 1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 1998-2001
Argentina ARG x x x x x x x x
Australia AUS x x x x x x x
Burkina Faso BFA x x x x x x x x
Bulgaria BGR x x x
Bolivia BOL x x x x x x x x
Brazil BRA x x x x x x x x x
Botswana BWA x x x x x x x
Canada CAN x x x x x x x
Chile CHL x x x x x x x x x
China CHN x x x x
Cote d'Ivoire CIV x x x x x x
Cameroon CMR x x x x x x x
Congo, Rep. COG x x x x
Colombia COL x x x x x x x x x
Costa Rica CRI x x x x x x x x
Denmark DNK x x x x x x x x x
Dominican Republic DOM x x x x x
Algeria DZA x x
Ecuador ECU x x x x x x x x x
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY x x x x x x x
Ethiopia ETH x x x x x
Gabon GAB x x x
Ghana GHA x x x x x x x x x
Gambia, The GMB x x x x x x
Guatemala GTM x x x x x x x x x
Honduras HND x x x x x x x x x
Haiti HTI x x x x x x x x x
Hungary HUN x x x x x
Indonesia IDN x x x x x x x x
India IND x x x x x x x x x
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN x x x x x x x
Jamaica JAM x x x x x x x
Japan JPN x x x x x x
Kenya KEN x x x x x x x x
Korea, Rep. KOR x x x x x x x
Sri Lanka LKA x x x x x x x x x
Morocco MAR x x x x x x x x x
Madagascar MDG x x x x x x x x
Mexico MEX x x x x x x x x
Mali MLI x x x x
Malaysia MYS x x x x x x x x
Nigeria NGA x x x x x x x x x
Nicaragua NIC x x x x x x x x
Norway NOR x x x x x x x
New Zealand NZL x x x x x x
Pakistan PAK x x x x x x x x x
Peru PER x x x x x x x x x
Philippines PHL x x x x x x x x x
Papua New Guinea PNG x x x x x
Poland POL x x
Paraguay PRY x x x x x x x x x
Romania ROM x x x
Senegal SEN x x x x x x x x
Singapore SGP x x x x x x x x x
Sierra Leone SLE x x x x x x x x x
El Salvador SLV x x x x x x x x x
Togo TGO x x x x x x x
Thailand THA x x x x x x x x x
Trinidad and Tobago TTO x x x x x x
Tunisia TUN x x x x x x x x
Turkey TUR x x x x x x x x
Tanzania TZA x x x
Uganda UGA x x x x x
Uruguay URY x x x x x x x x x
United States USA x x x x x x x
Venezuela, RB VEN x x x x x x x x x
South Africa ZAF x x x
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR x x x x x x x
Zambia ZMB x x x x x x x x x
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